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Abstract
We study a generalization of the model of a dark market due to Duffie-Gaˆrleanu-
Pedersen [6]. Our market is segmented and involves multiple assets. We show
that this market has a unique asymptotically stable equilibrium. In order to es-
tablish this result, we use a novel approach inspired by a theory due to McKenzie
and Hawkins-Simon. Moreover, we obtain a closed form solution for the price of
each asset at which investors trade at equilibrium. We conduct a comparative
statics analysis which shows, among other sensitivities, how equilibrium prices
respond to the level of interactions between investors.
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1. Introduction
An over-the-counter (OTC) market is a decentralized market, without a
physical exchange place, where investors trade privately. Trades may take
place through telephone or online, and transactions are concluded bilaterally
between any two parties. Some OTC markets allow market-makers and traders.
As mentioned in Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pederson [7], several types of assets,
such as mortgage-backed securities, swaps and many other types of derivatives,
emerging-market debt, corporate bonds, government bonds, bank loans, private
equity, and real estate, are traded in OTC markets. A trade between a seller
and a buyer is executed when they agree on the price. In general, OTC markets
are less transparent than stock markets, which is why they are also called dark
markets (see [5]).
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nndoune@uottawa.ca (Ndoune´ Ndoune´), rpongou@uottawa.ca; rpongou@hsph.harvard.edu
(Roland Pongou)
In this paper, we study an extension of the OTC market that is segmented
and involves multiple assets. An OTC market with K assets is said to be
partially segmented (or simply segmented) if buyers have to decide, prior to
entering the market, which one of the K assets they want to buy. Each agent
holds at most one unit of any asset i and cannot short-sell. The partially
segmented OTC market models were introduced by Vayanos and Wang [17] for
the case of two assets with different liquidity assumptions. Another model of
a segmented OTC market is studied by Weill [18]. These two models appear
as the first extensions of the Duffie-Gaˆrleanu-Pederson OTC model (see [6] and
[7]). In a partially segmented market, each buyer looks for a specific asset, then
searches for a potential seller of this asset.
For example, if an investor wants a particular corporate bond, he enters the
market and looks for a seller of the corporate bond no matter if, at this moment,
another similar corporate bond may be more liquid than the first one. This
reflects the opacity of information; the prices are unpublished and the other
agents in the market are unaware of the price at which the asset is traded.
A market can be segmented in order to reduce unfair competition between
investors. The segmentation of a market allows each investor to get a private
monopoly of a given asset in order to increase the price from the socially optimal
price and therefore sell at a higher price.
Segmented OTCmarkets with multiple assets are highly prevalent in real life,
but they have not been sufficiently studied. Yet understanding the functioning of
these markets has practical implications, as investors seek investment strategies
that employ sophisticated asset allocations and in-depth research which aims
at supplying specific results adapted to their needs. This is a great motivation
among so many others to study this class of markets. In this paper, our goal is
threefold. First, we study the asymptotic stability of these markets, which is
important to understand their long-run predictions. Second, we derive a closed
form solution for the price of each asset at which investors trade at equilibrium.
Third, we conduct a comparative statics analysis of the price of each asset, and
characterize the cross elasticity of the demand.
In our model, each investor’s liquidity is characterized by two states, namely
a “high” and a “low” state. Also each investor either owns one unit of an asset
i or does not own it. A transaction occurs when a high type investor who does
not own a specific asset meets a seller of this asset, that is, a low liquidity type
investor owning the asset (see [2]). We assume that the assets are differentiated
by their liquidity and intrinsic value, so that we can compare the preferences
of investors in relation to each asset and liquidity. As in Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and
Pederson [6], we assume that each agent’s utility function is linear and depends
on his type, his wealth and time. An asset may be hit by a valuation shock,
with these shocks being independent across assets.
Our first result is to show that any partially segmented OTC market with
multiple assets has a unique asymptotically stable equilibrium (Theorem 3.1).
This finding is essential for the understanding of the long-run behavior of this
class of markets. Indeed, it implies that any market state is transitory, unless it
coincides with the equilibrium state. This also means that any market state that
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starts near the equilibrium moves closer to it as time elapses, and any displaced
motion gets back to the equilibrium. We should also note that, in addition to
the substantive finding, we make a methodological contribution in the sense that
we rely on new arguments to establish our result. In fact, due to the existence
of multiple assets in the market, the method used in the pioneering work of
Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pederson [6] cannot be extended to our environment. Our
argument uses a theory developed by Mckenzie [11] and Hawkins and Simon
[10] and exploit the properties of Hurwitz determinants. Our methodology also
allows us to derive the equilibrium timing of the seller, which is the expected
number of days that an asset stays in the market before it is sold 1.
Our second result gives a closed-form solution of the price at which each
asset is traded at equilibrium (Theorem 4.1). We note that the price of each as-
set depends on its exogenous characteristics and on the characteristics of other
assets. It also depends on the level of interactions between agents. More for-
mally, the price of a given asset can be expressed as a quotient of polynomial
functions of the exogenous parameters of the model and the unique steady state
equilibrium. We provide an example that shows how prices are determined. Im-
portantly, it should be noted that because these prices are equilibrium prices,
small shocks to their exogenous determinants can temporarily move them, but
they will ultimately return to their equilibrium level.
We are also interested in studying the rate of change of the equilibrium prices
when some exogenous parameters of the model grow simultaneously to infinity.
We find that the limit prices, taken as the asymptotic limit of exogenous pa-
rameters, may not exist (Proposition 6.1). Such a situation could not happen
in Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pederson [7], because the parameters of the segmen-
tation were not considered in the seminal model. One important result shows
that there are two kinds of exogenous parameters, the first being the type of
parameters whose variation maintains the existence of equilibrium prices and
the second being the type of parameters that express the segmentation which
break it off. By changing randomly these parameters, the equilibrium prices can
be broken when the parameters grow to infinity. It is noteworthy that the corre-
sponding result shows that the variation of the intensities of meetings maintains
the equilibrium prices (Proposition 6.1).
Our last result characterizes the cross elasticity of the demand, for equilib-
rium prices, that is, the responsiveness of the variation of an exogenous param-
eter for a given asset to change in the price of other assets (Proposition 6.2).
Indeed, the cross elasticity analysis shows that, depending on the values of the
other parameters, the price of an asset increases or decreases in the frequency
at which agents meet for the exchange of that asset. Surprisingly, there exists,
for each given asset, a value of its frequency of meeting which makes its price
constant. We provide a simple example that illustrates our theoretical findings.
Because these findings are specific to markets involving multiple assets, they
1((In the case of one asset, [7] show that the equilibrium price can be obtained as the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a Rubinstein-type alternating-offers game.))
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constitute a useful addition to those found in the classical papers of Duffie,
Gaˆrleanu and Pederson ([6],[7]) and Duffie [5].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the
model of a segmented OTC market with multiple assets. In section 3, we show
that any segmented OTC market with multiple assets has a unique steady state
which is asymptotically stable. In section 4, we obtain a closed form solution for
the equilibrium price of each asset. We present a numerical illustration of our
analysis in section 5. In section 6, we conduct a comparative statics analysis.
Finally, section 7 concludes with a discussion of directions for further research.
For clarity of exposition, we collect all the proofs in the appendix.
2. A Model of a Segmented Dark Market with Multiple Assets
In their paper [6], Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen present their model of OTC
market with one traded asset as a dynamical system of four differential equa-
tions with two constraints which can be reduced to a system of two differential
equations with two constraints. In this section, we briefly present our model,
inspired by their model, with K traded assets, K ≥ 1, and segmentation. Fol-
lowing Duffie [5], let us consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and {Ft, t ≥ 0}
a filtration, that is the time t information set, which is the σ-algebra of events
that are known to the market participants at time t. The filtration models the
evolution of information as it becomes available over time. Our OTC finan-
cial market model is based on the observation of a continuous time stochastic
vector process expressing asset price processes. The components of the vector
process could include for instance, security prices, interest rates, indicators for
certain political events, insurance claims, and trade balance, to name just a
fiew. For more details we refer the readers to [12]. In our market, there are
two kinds of investors: buyers and sellers, who consume a single nonstorable
good that is used as a numeraire. We do not consider OTC market models with
market-makers in this study.
The set of available assets will be denoted I = {1, ...,K}. Investors can
hold at most one unit of any asset i ∈ I and cannot short-sell. Time is treated
continuously and runs forever. The market is populated by a continuum of
investors. At each time, an investor is characterized by whether he owns the i-
th asset or not, and by an intrinsic type which is either a ’high’ or a ’low’ liquidity
state. Our interpretation of liquidity state is the same as in [6]. For example, a
low-type investor who owns an asset may have a need for cash and thus wants to
liquidate his position. A high-type investor who does not own an asset may want
to buy the asset if he has enough cash. Through time, investors’ ownerships
will switch randomly because of meetings leading to trades and the investor’s
intrinsic type will change independently via an autonomous movement which
can be considered as an idiosyncratic shock. This dynamics of an investor’s
type change is modeled by a (non-homogeneous) continuous-time Markov chain
Z(t) on the finite set of states E. The state of an investor is given by an element
of E = {(l, n), (hi, o), (hi, n), (li, o), i ∈ I}, where the first letter designates the
investor’s intrinsic liquidity state and the second designates whether the investor
4
owns the asset i or not. If an investor initially does not own any asset and is
a low-type, the switching intensity of becoming a high-type is denoted γ˜ui as it
depends on the asset type. If he initially does not own any asset but is a high-
type, his switching intensity of becoming a low-type is denoted γ˜di. However, if
an investor initially owns the specific asset i and is a high-type, the switching
intensity of becoming a low-type is denoted by γdi. Finally, if he initially owns a
specific asset i but is a low-type, the switching intensity of becoming a high-type
is γui. We make the liquidity switches depend on the asset because these assets
could have different purchase prices and dividend flows.
Let δhi > 0 be the dividend flow from asset i. A low-type investor, who
owns the asset i, has a holding cost δdi, with δhi > δdi > 0. If θi(t) denote
the ownership process for asset i, i.e. θi(t) = 1 if Z(t) ∈ {(hi, o), (li, o)} and
θi(t) = 0 if Z(t) ∈ {(hi, n), (l, n)}.
We define the asset value process as follows:
dA(t) ,
∑
i∈I
[
θi(t)
(
δhi − δdi1{Z(t)=(li,o)}
)
dt− Pi(t)dθi(t)
]
(1)
where Pi(t) is the price of the ith asset. This process is part of the wealth
process which will be used in the price derivation.
In addition, investors meet each other randomly at a Poisson rate λi, but an
exchange of the asset occurs only if an investor of type (li, o) meets an investor
of type (hi, n). One should notice that, without changes of positions, the system
would stop after a finite time and the market would become inefficient. At any
given time t, let µt(z) denote the proportion of investors in state z ∈ E. So, for
each t ≥ 0, µt is a probability law on E.
Letmi denote the proportion of asset i, with i ∈ I. The dynamical system of
investors’ type proportion measure µt(z) for each z ∈ E, consists of the system
of equations:
µ˙t(hi, n) = −λiµt(hi, n)µt(li, o) + γ˜uiµt(l, n)− γ˜diµt(hi, n), ∀i ∈ I (2)
µ˙t(l, n) =
∑
i∈I
λiµt(hi, n)µt(li, o)−
∑
i∈I
γ˜uiµt(l, n) +
∑
i∈I
γ˜diµt(hi, n) (3)
µ˙t(hi, o) = λiµt(hi, n)µt(li, o) + γuiµt(li, o)− γdiµt(hi, o), ∀i ∈ I (4)
µ˙t(li, o) = −λiµt(hi, n)µt(li, o)− γuiµt(li, o) + γdiµt(hi, o), ∀i ∈ I (5)
with the K + 1 constraints
µt(hi, o) + µt(li, o) = mi, ∀i ∈ I∑
i∈I
mi +
∑
i∈I
µt(hi, n) + µt(l, n) = 1.
Following [2], the above dynamical system can be reduced to the following
equivalent system of 2K equations:
µ˙t(hi, n) = −λiµt(hi, n)µt(li, o) + γ˜uiµt(l, n)− γ˜diµt(hi, n), ∀i ∈ I
µ˙t(li, o) = −λiµt(hi, n)µt(li, o)− γuiµt(li, o) + γdiµt(hi, o), ∀i ∈ I
(6)
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with the K + 1 constraints
µt(hi, o) + µt(li, o) = mi, ∀i ∈ I (7)∑
i∈I
mi +
∑
i∈I
µt(hi, n) + µt(l, n) = 1 (8)
3. The Stability of Dark Markets
3.1. Definitions and Concepts
We recall that a steady state of a dynamical system is a state at which the
behavior of the system is unchanging in time. A steady state is stable when
the system always returns to the steady state after small disturbances. If for
all initial values, the nearby integral curves all converge towards a steady state
solution as t increases, then the steady state is said to be asymptotically stable.
If the system moves away from the steady state after small perturbations, then
the steady state is unstable. The notion of stability is very important to analyze
the behavior of dynamical systems. In control theory, it means that if for any
finite signal, the system produces a finite output signal, then the system is stable.
For an OTC market, the stability can roughly be understood as a state where,
despite small price and volatility changes of assets, the asset prices are not going
far away from the equilibrium prices. The fluctuations of prices do not affect
roughly the dynamic of markets. The asymptotic stability appears as a powerful
tool to predict dark markets. More precisely it helps to understand that, despite
all fluctuations, in the long run, market prices will remain close to steady state
prices. More rigorously, let us consider an autonomous differential system x˙(t) =
F (x(t)) with F : [0,∞) × D −→ Rn a function piecewise continuous in t and
locally Lypschitz in x, where D is a domain containing the solution x(t).
Definition 3.1. • A solution x0 of the above system is said to be stable if
given any ǫ > 0 and any t0 ≥ 0, there exists a δ = δ(ǫ, t0) > 0 such that
||x(t0)−x
0(t0)|| < δ implies ||x(t)−x
0(t)|| < ǫ, for all t ≥ t0 ≥ 0, for any
solution x(t).
• A solution x0 of the above system is said to be asymptotically stable if it
is stable and for any t0 ≥ 0, there exists a constant c = c(t0) > 0 such
that whenever ||x(t0)− x
0(t0)|| < c, we have lim
t→∞
||x(t)− x0(t)|| = 0.
Given an autonomous differential system x˙ = F (x), where F is a twice con-
tinuously differentiable function, using Taylor’s theorem, we can approximate
the model at the steady state with a linear model. A very standard result in
dynamical systems states that the original system is asymptotically stable if all
the eigenvalues of the approximating linear system have negative real parts (see
[3] p. 386). Appendix A gives more details and a rigorous treatment of these
notions.
In order to study the asymptotic stability of OTCmarket models with several
assets, we need also to recall some concepts related to diagonally dominant
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matrices. A good presentation of this theory can be found, for instance, in the
book Mathematical Economics by A. Takayama [15].
Let A = (aij) be an n×n complex matrix. We say that the matrix A is diag-
onally dominant (abbreviated d.d.), if there exist positive numbers d1, d2, ..., dn
satisfying the inequality di|aii| >
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj |aij |. Technically, this is the definition
of row dominance but we could work equivalently with the transpose notion
of column dominance. In several works, this is called the GDD (generalized
diagonal dominant) matrices and diagonal dominance sometimes means the fol-
lowing stricter property due to Hadamard: for all i = 1, .., n |aii| >
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
|aij |.
We will call this property strictly d.d. Obviously, A is d.d. if and only if DA
is strictly d.d. with D = diag(d1, d2, ..., dn). Hadamard shows that strictly d.d.
matrices are non-singular. McKenzie provides the proof of its generalization to
d.d. matrices. On the other hand, Hadamard’s theorem is a direct consequence
of Gerschgorin’s disks theorem (see, for instance, Varga [16].)
3.2. Main Result
We now present the main result of this section in the theorem below.
Theorem 3.1. Every partially segmented market model with several assets has
a unique steady state which is asymptotically stable.
It was shown in [2] that every partially segmented OTC market model with
several assets has a steady state which is unique. For the proof of asymptotic
stability, we denote by x∗ the unique equilibrium state, that is F (x∗) = 0. We
take a multivariate Taylor’s expansion of the function F at the equilibrium state
x∗ and we just keep a linear approximation of our differential system, that gives
rise to the linear system. The steady state is reached when all of the investors’
state proportions remain constant in time, so all derivatives in the left-hand-side
of equation (6) are 0. The linear system obtained has the form y˙ = Ay, where A
is the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium. Note that y = x− x∗ has the origin
as equilibrium state, and this equilibrium has the same properties as the steady
state x∗. We have thus reduced the problem to the study of the stability of the
matrix A, that is to show that all its eigenvalues have a negative real parts. This
problem leads us to a new class of matrices that has never been studied before,
but we show that it is connected to the diagonally dominant matrices, using the
steady state and the results in [11] and [10]. Since the square matrix obtained
is a matrix with non positive off-diagonal elements, we use the Hawkins-Simon
theorem (see [10]) to find a positive vector d = (d1, d2, ..., d3) that is a solution of
the inequality Ax > 0. Finally, we extend MacKenzie’s theorem in the current
context.
Let us first simplify the notations of our Master Equations (5). Set xi =
µt(hi, n); xK+i = µt(li, o), for all i = 1, 2, · · · ,K and m =
∑
i∈Imi. The above
system with the 1 +K constraints becomes
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x˙i = −λixixK+i − γ˜ixi − γ˜ui
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
xj + γ˜ui(1−m), ∀i ∈ I
x˙K+i = −λixixK+i − γixK+i + γdimi, ∀i ∈ I
(9)
Let x = (x1, x2, ..., x2K) denote a vector in R
2K . And let I = [0, 1]2K with
f = (f1, f2, ..., f2K) : I −→ R
2K , defined by:
fi(x) = −λixixK+i − γ˜ixi − γ˜ui
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
xj + γ˜ui(1 −m)
fK+i(x) = −λixixK+i − γixK+i + γdimi, ∀i ∈ I.
(10)
The Jacobian matrix of f is the 2K × 2K matrix given by J(x) = (∂fi(x)
∂xj
)
where
∂fi(x)
∂xj
= −λixK+i− γ˜i;
∂fi(x)
∂xK+i
= −λixi and
∂fi(x)
∂xi
= −γ˜ui;
∂fi(x)
∂xK+j
= 0 for j 6= i
∂fK+i(x)
∂xi
= −λixK+i;
∂fK+i(x)
∂xK+i
= −λixi − γi and
∂fK+i(x)
∂xj
= 0; ∂fK+i(x)
∂xK+j
= 0
for j 6= i.
Hence the matrix J(x) can be expressed as the block matrix
J(x) =
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
where the matices A11, A12, A21 and A22 are described explicitly in Appendix
C.
Because the matrix J(x) is a square matrix with non positive off-diagonal
elements, we use the Hawkins-Simon theorem (see [10]) to find a positive vector
d = (d1, d2, ..., d3) such that J(x)d > 0. This condition is equivalent to showing
that all the determinants of the principal minors of this matrix are positive. We
notice that, after elementary operations on the lines of these determinants, each
of them is equivalent to the well-known Hurwitz determinant. This connection
enables us, to show that these determinants are positive. Thus the given matrix
is a d.d matrix. Hence the unique steady state x∗ is asymptotically stable, and
we have obtained the proof of theorem 3.1.
4. Equilibrium Inter-investor Asset Pricing
The steady state equilibrium proportions of investors for a segmented OTC
model with multiple assets is determined in [2] and its asymptotic stability is
8
established above. In this section, we will use the equilibrium masses above,
in order to compute the equilibrium bargaining prices P1, P2,...,PK for the
respective assets 1,2,...,K. The authors in [1] propose a method to show how to
obtain the traded prices of the assets at the unique steady state (equilibrium)
for non-segmented market models. These prices, however, were not computed
explicitly. The objective of this section is to give an explicit formula of the steady
state traded prices for any partially segmented market model with multiple
assets.
The ownership and price processes, θi and Pi(t), respectively, were intro-
duced in section 2 along with the asset value process dA(t). Agents are risk-
neutral and infinitely lived. Agents can invest in a bank account with a risk-free
interest rate of r, assumed to be constant. A low-type agent li, when owning
the asset has a holding cost δdi per time unit while a high-type agent has the full
holding dividend δhi. Let U denote a utility function. A consumption process is
an Ft-progressively measurable, nonnegative process c satisfying
∫ T
0
c(t) dt <∞
almost surely. The cumulative consumption process C is related to the con-
sumption rate process c and is defined by the formula C(t) =
∫ t
0
c(s) ds, where
0 ≤ t ≤ T . Following Duffie et al. [6], we obtain for the case of multiple assets,
the wealth equation:
dW (t) = rW (t)dt− C(t)dt
+
∑
i∈I
[
θi(t)
(
δhi − δdi1{Z(t)=(li,o)}
)
dt− Pi(t)dθi(t)
] (11)
where C is a cumulative consumption process, θi(t) ∈ {0, 1} is a feasible holding
process for the asset i, with initial wealth W (0) = w0. As usual, prices are
obtained from the following expected utility maximization problem:
sup
{C(v),θ1(v),...,θK(v)}
E
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(v−t)U(C(v))dv | Z(t) = z,W (t) = w
]
(12)
subject to the constraint
dW (t) = rW (t)dt− C(t)dt
+
∑
i∈I
[
θi(t)
(
δhi − δdi1{Z(t)=(li,o)}
)
dt− Pi(t)dθi(t)
]
. (13)
Proceeding exactly as in [1], section 4, and in the spirit of Duffie et al. (see
[6], [7]), the value functions V (t, z) for the states z ∈ E are linear functions in
wealth and satisfy the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations:
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V˙ (t, (l, n)) = −
∑
i∈I
V (t, (hi, n))γ˜ui +
(
r +
∑
i∈I
γ˜ui
)
V (t, (l, n)) (14)
V˙ (t, (hi, n)) = − (V (t, (hi, o))− Pi(t)) λiµt(li, o)− V (t, (l, n))γ˜di (15)
+ (γ˜di + r + λiµt(li, o))V (t, (hi, n)
V˙ (t, (hi, o)) = (γdi + r) V (t, (hi, o))− γdiV (t, (li, o))− δhi (16)
V˙ (t, (li, o)) = (γui + r + λiµt(hi, n))V (t, (li, o))− γuiV (t, (hi, o)) (17)
−λiµt(hi, n)(V (t, (l, n)) + Pi(t))− (δhi − δdi)
From which we get the steady-state equations:
0 = −
∑
i∈I
V (t, (hi, n))γ˜ui +
(
r +
∑
i∈I
γ˜ui
)
V (t, (l, n))
0 = −λiµ(li, o) (V (hi, o)− Pi)− γ˜diV (l, n) + (γ˜di + r + λiµ(li, o))V (hi, n),
0 = (γdi + r) V (hi, o)− γdiV (li, o)− δhi,
0 = (γui + r + λiµ(hi, n))V (li, o)− γuiV (hi, o)− λiµ(hi, n)(V (l, n) + Pi)
−(δhi − δdi), ∀i ∈ I.
Because we do not consider the presence of market-makers in our markets,
the prices are negotiated bilaterally by the agents. A high-type non-owner pays
at most his reservation value ∆hi = V (hi, o) − V (hi, n) in order to obtain the
asset i and the low-type owner requires a price of at least ∆li = V (li, o)−V (l, n).
The steady state price Pi for asset i is such that ∆
l
i ≤ Pi ≤ ∆
h
i . Following [7],
Nash (1950) bargaining leads to the following equibrium price for asset i:
Pi = (1− qi)∆
l
i + qi∆
h
i (18)
where qi ∈ (0, 1) represents the bargaining power of the seller (li, o) and depends
only on the asset i ∈ I. We assume in the rest of this article that it is constant,
that is, qi = q for each asset i; this assumption can be understood as replacing
qi by the mean of the distribution of the bargaining powers of the seller for the
aboveK assets. We need to solve the above linear system. We set V (hi, n) = xi,
V (li, o) = yi, V (hi, o) = zi, V (l, n) = w, λiµ(li, 0) = ai, γ˜di+ r+λiµ(li, 0) = bi,
γui+r+λiµ(hi, n) = bi, λiµ(hi, n) = di and ri = γui+r. Using these notations,
we have Pi = (1− q)(yi − w) + q(zi − xi) and hence the above linear system is
equivalent to the system
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0 = −
∑
i∈I
xiγ˜ui +
(
r +
∑
i∈I
γ˜ui
)
w
0 = (bi − qai)xi + (1− q)aiyi − (1− q)aizi − (γ˜di + (1 − q)ai)w, ∀i ∈ I
0 = rizi − γdiyi − δhi, ∀i ∈ I
0 = qdixi + (ci − qdi)yi − (γui + qdi)zi − qdiw − (δhi − δdi),
∀i ∈ I.
It is a linear system and we have three equations for each i in I. If we let w
be the parameter, we obtain a system of three equations in three variables xi,
yi and zi which are given in terms of w. Since zi =
γdi
ri
yi +
δhi
ri
, it is sufficient
to express xi and yi in term of w. A straightforward calculation gives us
xi =
(
1 + γi+r
qdi
)(
1 + γ˜di(1−q)ai
)
− 1(
1 + γi+r
qdi
)(
1 + γ˜di+r(1−q)ai
)
− 1
w +
δdi(
1 + γi+r
qdi
)(
1 + γ˜di+r(1−q)ai
)
− 1
. (19)
For notational simplicity, we set Ψ(i, r) =
(
1 + γi+r
qdi
)(
1 + γ˜di(1−q)ai
)
− 1,
Γ(i, r) =
(
1 + γi+r
qdi
)(
1 + γ˜di+r(1−q)ai
)
− 1, Λ(i, r) = Ψ(i,r)Γ(i,r) and Ω(i, r) =
δdi
qdiΓ(i,r)
.
With these notations we have xi = Λ(i, r)w + Ω(i, r). Now we can compute w
explicitly using the expression of xi and the first equation of our linear system.
Thus w =
∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i,r)
r+
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1−Λ(i,r))
which is positive because Λ(i, r) belongs to (0, 1).
We obtain explicit expressions of xi and yi, which, in turn, give us the formula
for the price Pi as shown below.
Theorem 4.1. For any partially segmented market model, there exists a unique
steady-state equilibrium and the equilibrium prices are given by
Pi =
(
γdi
(1− q)aiΓ(i, r)
− Λ(i, r)
) ∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1− Λ(i, r))
+
δhi
r
− qΩ(i, r)
(
1 +
(
1− r +
γdi
q
)(
1 +
γ˜di
(1− q)ai
))
, ∀i ∈ I
(20)
For each asset i, two bargainers, a seller and a buyer, are faced with a finite
number of possible alternatives. If the two investors agree on an alternative
payoff, the transaction is executed. Otherwise, if they fail to agree, the trans-
action does not occur. When the bargaining mechanism begins, the seller of
the asset i proposes the price P+i and accepts any price greater than or equal
to P+i , the buyer in turn proposes the price P
−
i and accepts all prices less
than or equal to P−i . Here we are in presence of a Nash bargaining problem
or the Rubinstein-type game, for more details we refer to ([7],[13]). A Nash
equilibrium is an action profile with the property that, no single player can
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obtain a higher payoff by deviating unilaterally from this profile; a player will
not gain by changing his strategy. The unique price P ∗i at which the transaction
is executed is a Nash equilibrium. It is well-known that there exists a vector
of payoffs (P ∗1 , P
∗
2 , ..., P
∗
K) which is the unique Nash bargaining vector solution.
The negotiation process stops when it reachs a Nash equilibrium. Following
([7],[13]) we apply the devise of Rubinstein-Wolinsky to calculate explicitly the
unique bargaining powers that represent the prices. For a given asset i, the two
investors find each other randomly, the seller with probability qˆ and the buyer
with probability 1− qˆ, to suggest a trading price. The seller of the asset i makes
an offer and the buyer who needs this asset proposes another price. The seller
can accept or reject the offer. If the offer is rejected, the seller of the asset i
receives the dividend from the asset i during this period. The bargaining may
break down before a counter offer is made. At the next period ∆it later, one
of the investor is chosen to make a new offer. This process occurs simultane-
ously for each of the trading assets 1, 2, ...,K. The next period at which the
first investor in the market is chosen randomly after leaving his first partner is
min{∆it, 1 ≤ i ≤ K}; and the next period at which the last investor in the mar-
ket is chosen randomly after leaving his first partner is max{∆it, 1 ≤ i ≤ K}.
The limiting price as ∆it approaches zero is represented by Pi = (1−q)∆
l
i+q∆
h
i ,
with the bargaining power of the seller q equal to qˆ. An impatient agent who
wants to optimize its profit can search for alternative partners during negoti-
ations to get the best offer for the asset i. If he finds a godsend or he trusts
to find one, he leaves his partner for a new one. In this market, for each asset
j 6= i, a similar mechanism may occur. But there is no interaction between
two agents who are bargaining for two separate assets, because the market is
partially segmented. If an agent leaves his partner, he will bargain with another
investor that has the same focus regarding asset. However, an unsophisticated
investor does not search for an alternative partner during the bargaining, in this
case the formulae of payoff price remains unchanged except the new bargaining
power that becomes q = 1
K
K∑
i=1
qˆ(r+γi+γ˜i+λiµ(li,o))
qˆ(r+γi+γ˜i+λiµ(li,o))+(1−qˆ)(r+γi+γ˜i+λiµ(hi,n))
. We
solve the homogeneous linear system obtained from the equations (9)− (12) to
get the equilibrium prices as the unique solution of this system. Thus we have
the prices P1, P2, ..., PK .
If we agree that the potential number of open days for which the stock market
is open in a year is around 250, given the equilibrium proportion of potential
buyers, µ(hi, n), for the asset i, the average number of days needed to sell the
asset i is given by 250(λiµ(hi, n))
−1, with i = 1, 2, ...,K. This average time is
called equilibrium timing of seller. We obtained a finite sequence of times for
all sold assets. The last asset to be sold gives the maximum equilibrium timing
and the first asset sold gives the minimum equilibrium timing.
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5. A Numerical Example
For this numerical illustration, we consider an OTC market with K = 2
assets. The search intensity of λ1 = 1250 in the first table below means that
an investor looking for asset 1 expects to be in contact with 1250 investors each
year, that is on average 1250upslope250 = 5 investors per day. The search intensity
of λ2 = 2000 in the first table below means that an investor looking for asset 2
expects to be in contact with 2000 investors each year, that is 2000upslope250 = 8
investors per day on average. The parameters for the pricing model can be
found in the table below.
λ1 λ2 γu1 γd1 γu2 γd2 m1 m2 γ˜u1 γ˜d1 γ˜u2 γ˜d2
1250 2000 5 0.5 8 3 0.3 0.6 2.5 3.5 0.4 1.5
The second group of parameters for the pricing model is given in the following
table
δh1 δh2 δd1 δd2 q r
2.5 3.5 0.4 1.5 0.5 0.05
Now we can compute the unique equilibrium vector proportions and asset prices
at the equilibrium. We recall that the equilibrium occurs when we have
0 = −λiµ(hi, n)µ(li, o) + γ˜uiµ(l, n)− γ˜diµ(hi, n), i ∈ {1, 2} (21)
0 = −λiµ(hi, n)µ(li, o)− γuiµ(li, o) + γdiµ(hi, o), i ∈ {1, 2} (22)
with the constraints
µ(hi, o) + µ(li, o) = mi, i ∈ {1, 2} (23)
m1 +m2 + µ(h1, n) + µ(h2, n) + µ(l, n) = 1 (24)
The equations (20) and (21) imply for i 6= j, the following system
µ(hi, n) = −
γ˜ui
γ˜i
µ(hj, n) +
γiγdimi
γ˜i(λiµ(hi, n) + γi)
+ γ˜ui (1−m) +
γdi
γ˜i
mi, i ∈ {1, 2}.
By setting x = µ(h1, n) and y = µ(h2, n) and replacing all parameters by their
numerical values we get the following system of two equations with two variables.
y = −1.05x+
0.1375
1250x+ 5.5
+ 0.175 (1)
x = −1.2y +
1.98
2000y+ 11
+ 0.02 (2)
We can substitute y in the second equation with its value in the first equa-
tion. By straightforward calculations, one obtains the following quartic equation
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2294300x4+606494x3−75548.2132x2−693.572x−1.500884 = 0. The only pos-
itive root of this equation is x∗ = 0.0991, that is µ∗(h1,n) = 0.0991 and therefore
µ∗(h2,n) = 0.0720. From the relation
µ(li, o) =
γdimi
λiµ(hi, n) + γi
, i ∈ {1, 2} (25)
at the equilibrium, we have µ∗(l1,0) = 0.0011 and µ
∗
(l2,0) = 0.0116; moreover, we
use the constraints (22) and (23) to get µ∗(h1,0) = 0.2984, µ
∗
(h2,o) = 0.5883 and
µ∗(l,n) = 0.0289. It remains to compute the equilibrium prices P1 and P2 for the
two assets. From Theorem 4.1, we have
Pi =
(
γdi
(1 − q)aiΓ(i, r)
− Λ(i, r)
) ∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1 − Λ(i, r))
+
δhi
r
− qΩ(i, r)
(
1 + (1− r +
γdi
q
)(1 +
γ˜di
(1− q)ai
)
)
, i ∈ {1, 2}
. (26)
Before computing the values P1 and P2 we need to determine the intermediate
settings that appear in the formulae. They have been grouped in the following
table
Γ(1, r) Γ(2, r) Ω(1, r) Ω(2, r) Λ(1, r) Λ(2, r) Ψ(1, r) Ψ(2, r)
5.7159 0.3075 0.0011 0.0677 0.9861 0.9837 5.6366 0.3026
Using the data in the table above and the formula (25), we have P1 = 50.0031
and P2 = 69.6551. The following table gives the equilibrium proportions and
asset prices for the model with two assets:
µ∗(h1,n) µ
∗
(h2,n) µ
∗
(l1,o) µ
∗
(l2,o) µ
∗
(h1,o) µ
∗
(h2,o) µ
∗
(l,n) P1 P2
0.0991 0.0720 0.0011 0.0116 0.2989 0.5883 0.0289 50.0031 69.6551
We recall that if the equilibrium proportion of potential buyers for the asset
i is known, the average time needed to sell the asset i is 250(λiµ(hi, n))
−1,
with i = 1, 2; that is 250(λ1µ(h1, n))
−1 = 2 days to sell asset 1 and
250(λ2µ(h2, n))
−1 = 1.7 days to sell asset 2.
6. Comparative Statics and Cross Effect
We would like to study the rate of change of the equilibrium prices when
some exogenous parameters of the model vary simultaneously. Because these
models allow multiple assets, we cannot adapt the technique of Duffie [5] which
is based on the analysis of each exogenous parameter independently. For the
comparative statics of our model, the equilibrium prices are regarded as func-
tions with several variables and we use, for a given asset i, the limiting bar-
gaining power associated during negotiation. When we change the same type
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of parameters, the equilibrium prices can still exist or the equilibrium can be
broken. It is important to vary the same type of parameters at once and it is
useful to determine the behavior of the quantities Ψ(i, r), Γ(i, r), Λ(i, r) and
Ω(i, r). The following result characterizes the variation of equilibrium prices
when the same type of parameters approach infinity. One can see that, if all
γui and γdi approach infinity, then Ω(i, r) vanishes while Ψ(i, r) and Γ(i, r) ap-
proach infinity. We also have that Ψ(i, r) and Γ(i, r) become closer to zero as
λi tends to infinity for all i. Then for the same variation of λi, the expression
Ω(i, r) converges to Ω̂(i, r) = δdiq
1−q
µ(hi,n)
µ(li,o) (γ˜di+r)+γi+r
, while 1 − Λ(i, r) converges
to 1− Λ̂(i, r) = rqµ(hi,n)
δdiµ(li,o)
Ω̂(i, r) and γdi(1−q)aiΓ(i,r) tends to
qγdiµ(hi,n)
(1−q)δdiµ(li,o)
Ω̂(i, r).
Proposition 6.1. The equilibrium prices satisfy the following properties.
• When γuj approaches infinity for all j, the price Pi converges to
P̂i(λ)(γu) =
δhi
r
;
• When for all j, γdj approaches infinity, the price Pi converges to
P i(λ)(γu) =
δhi
r
− δdi
(1−q)λiµ(hi,n)+γ˜di
(1−q)λiµ(li,o)+γ˜di+r
;
• If for all j, γ˜uj approaches infinity or γ˜dj approaches infinity, then the
limit of the price Pi does not exist;
• When λj approaches infinity for all j, the price Pi converges to P̂i, where
the exact expression is given by
P̂i =
(
qγdiµ(hi, n)
(1 − q)δdiµ(li, o)
Ω̂(i, r)− Λ̂(i, r)
) ∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ̂(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1− Λ̂(i, r))
+
δhi
r
−
 δdi(2− r + γdiq )
q
1−q
µ(hi,n)
µ(li,o) (γ˜di + r) + γi + r
 , ∀i ∈ I.
(27)
We observe that there are two types of exogenous parameters, the homoge-
neous parameters whose variation maintains the existence of equilibrium prices
and the heterogeneous parameters that express the segmentation which break it.
By changing randomly these parameters, the equilibrium prices can be broken.
It means that we cannot go from a non-segmented model to a partially seg-
mented model by a continuum of values. Which implies that, in every partially
segmented market, the knowledge of the homogeneous parameters are not suf-
ficient to capture optimal information and percolation in the market. Thus, to
understand the behavior of any partially segmented market, we need the whole
parameters and the unique equilibrium steady state. There are also two sorts
of homogeneous parameters affecting the behavior of the equilibrium prices; the
limit prices when both λi and γui tend to infinity is the same when the parame-
ters γui tend to infinity. The same phenomenon happens if we replace γdi by γui
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in the above limit. This framework shows that the behavior of the equilibrium
prices at infinity are captured by the only parameters γui or γdi.
Now we analyse the cross-price elasticity that is, the responsiveness of the
variation of an exogenous parameter for the asset i to change in the price of
another asset, ceteris paribus. We investigate how the effect that an exogenous
parameter attached to the asset i can have on the price Pj , where j 6= i. For
example, if we consider the price Pj with regards to variations of the exogenous
parameter λi, we denote Pj = Pj(λi). Surprisingly, there is a constant value
depending on the jth parameter of the model where λi vanishes in the expression
Pj = Pj(λi). We are now in the position to prove the following result which
provides a nice characterization of the equilibrium effect on price sensitivities.
Proposition 6.2. There exists a constant λ̂(j) depending on the exogenous
parameters of the model and the equilibrium steady state such that:
1. the equilibrium price Pj(λi) is increasing when λ̂(j) < 0;
2. the equilibrium price Pj(λi), with j 6= i, is constant when λj is equal to
λ̂(j) > 0, that is Pj(λi) is invariant in λi;
3. the equilibrium price Pj(λi) are increasing for λi > λ̂(j) and are decreasing
for 0 < λj ≤ λ̂(j).
The new parameter λ̂(j) depends on the exogenous parameters of the model.
Since the transactions in OTC markets are done online or by phone, the network
effect is almost inevitable. The parameters that measure the network are the
frequencies λi. For every asset with liquid payoff, it will produce the network
effect, that is, many people will converge on the bargain and thus increase the
use of the asset. The facility to access the network can decrease or increase the
bargaining power of some investors. The investors who are far geographically,
such as in certain areas of Africa or Asia, and who do not have sophisticated
materials and high-quality networks are disadvantaged compared to others lo-
cated for instance in New York. The growth of the market and the presence of
multiple assets with liquidity payoffs can cause the network congestion.
For illustration, we consider a market with two assets. We present in Figure
1 the behavior of the price of asset 1 as a function of λ2 which is the encounter
frequency for exchanging item 2, for fixed values of λ1. We notice that P1 is a
decreasing function of λ2. When the frequency of meetings to exchange asset 1 is
sufficiently large ( λ1=6250) the decreasing of P1, when λ2 increases, accelerates.
In general, when λ1 and λ2 tend to infinity, the price of each asset tends to a
value that can be explicitly calculated using Proposition 7.1, thus P̂1 = 49.0824
and P̂2 = 57.2058. Another thing to note is that, although P1 is a monotone
function of λ2, it is not a monotone function of λ1. However, for sufficiently large
values of λ1, P1 becomes a monotone function of λ1, which explains the fact that
P1 converges asymptotically when the intensities of meetings tend to infinity.
A lesson to be kept is that the availability of information reduces prices if the
quantity of information is sufficiently large. On the other hand, the intensities
of meetings for asset 1 can be increasing, but with P1 being decreasing. In
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Figure 1: Variation of equilibrium prices P1(λ2)
Figure 1, for example, we have (5 > 0.002) but the corresponding values of the
price P1 are decreasing. This observation allows us to argue that the intensities
of meetings are not the only parameters that influence the equilibrium prices.
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of the price of asset 1 as a function of λ1,
which is the encounter frequency for exchanging item 1, for fixed values of λ2.
We notice that P1 is an increasing function of λ1 in this particular example.
In general, the price P1 is not a monotone function of λ1. Its monotonicity
depends on the sign of qγd1µ(h1,n)(1−q)δd1µ(l1,o)Ω(1, r) − Λ(1, r), which itself depends on
λ1. When the intensities of meetings to exchange asset 2 are sufficiently large
(λ2=250, λ2=1250, λ2=6250) the increase of P1, when λ1 increases, decelerates.
In this case, prices are very close and seem to converge towards a single price.
Surprisingly, we note that when the intensities of meetings to exchange asset 2
are sufficiently small (λ2=0.002), prices are also close to previous ones. But for
a random intensity of meetings to exchange asset 2, (λ2=5), the price P1 has
a high growth rate and is greater than the previous prices. So, we do not have
a monotonic behavior of equilibrium prices as a function of the frequency of
meetings, but rather a chaotic price movement over the intensities of meetings.
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7. Conclusion
This paper generalizes the model of OTC market due to Duffie-Gaˆrleanu-
Pedersen [6]. Our market is segmented and involves multiple assets, and we
analyze its long-run prediction. We show that the unique steady state of any
segmented OTC market is asymptotically stable. In addition, we find a closed
form solution for the equilibrium price of each asset. Our analysis shows how
prices respond to the level of interactions between agents and the other ex-
ogenous parameters of the model. We also obtain the rate of change of the
equilibrium prices when some exogenous parameters of the model grow simulta-
neously to infinity. In addition to the substantive contributions, we contribute
methodologically by developing new tools to study segmented dark markets with
multiple assets.
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Appendix A. Asymptotic Stability for ODE systems
We consider an autonomous differential system
x˙(t) = F (x(t)),
with F : [0,∞) ×D −→ Rn piecewise continuous in t and locally Lypschitz in
x, where D is a domain containing the solution x0.
The linear part of F at the point x0, denoted A = Df(x0) is the Jacobian
matrix of F at the point x0. Since the function is differentiable and its differen-
tial is continuous, Taylor’s Theorem for functions of several variables says that
f(x) = Df(x0)(x − x0) + θ(x), where θ is the function that is small near x0 in
the sense that lim
x→x0
θ(x)
||x−x0|| = 0. For a differential equation x˙(t) = F (x(t)), as
before, let x∗ denote a steady state and let A = Df(x∗) denote the Jacobian
matrix of F at the point x∗. Let (λi) be the family of all eigenvalues of A. We
have the following stability theorems (See [3], p.378).
Theorem Appendix A.1. A steady state equilibrium x∗ of the above system
is stable if and only if both of the following conditions hold:
• all eigenvalues of A have non positive real part, that is R(λi) ≤ 0.
• for every eigenvalue of real part R(λi) = 0 and algebraic multiplicity ηi ≥
1, we have Rank(A− λiI) = ηi
We are in position to give a very important result which characterizes the
asymptotic stability.
Theorem Appendix A.2. The steady state x∗ of the above system is asymp-
totically stable if and only if all eigenvalues of A have a negative real part, that
is R(λi) < 0, for all i.
Appendix B. Diagonally dominant matrices
Theorem Appendix B.1. (Hadamard-Levy-Desplanques) If an n× n matrix
A is d.d. then it is non-singular.
This theorem is a a particular case of the Gerschgorin theorem. We then
have the closely related result.
Theorem Appendix B.2. ( McKenzie) If an n×n matrix A has a generalized
diagonal dominant that is negative, then all its eigenvalues have negative real
parts.
As we will see, the problem of showing that a matrix is d.d. can oftentimes
be reduced to finding a positive solution to a linear system, it will be useful to
recall the Hawkins and Simon condition.
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Theorem Appendix B.3. (Hawkins-Simon) Let A be an n×n matrix with non
positive off-diagonal elements. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) the inequality AX > 0 has a positive solution,
(ii) det
 a11 · · · a1p... . . . ...
ap1 · · · app
 > 0 for all p = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Appendix C. Proof of the results
Lemma Appendix C.1. The matrix J(x) is a d.d. matrix.
Proof We recall that the matrix J(x) can be expressed as the block matrix
J(x) =
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
, where
A11 =

−λ1xK+1 − γ˜1 −γ˜u1 · · · −γ˜u1
−γ˜u2 −λ2xK+2 − γ˜2
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
... −γ˜uK−1 −γ˜uK−1
−γ˜uK · · · −γ˜uK −λKx2K − γ˜K

A12 =

−λ1x1 0 · · · 0
0 −λ2x2
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
... 0 0
0 · · · 0 −λKxK

A21 =

−λ1xK+1 0 · · · 0
0 −λ2xK+2
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
... 0 0
0 · · · 0 −λKx2K

and
22
A22 =

−λ1x1 − γ1 0 · · · 0
0 −λ2x2 − γ2
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
... 0 0
0 · · · 0 −λKxK − γ1

Note that the matrix J(x) satisfies the condition |aii| >
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
|aij | for i ∈
{K,K + 1, · · · , 2K}. We need to find a sequence of real numbers (di)1≤i≤n,
with di > 0 for each i such that DJ becomes a stricly d.d. matrix, where D is
the diagonal matrix given by
D =

d1 0 · · · 0
0 d2
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
... 0 0
0 · · · 0 d2K

.
The matrices A12, A21 and A22 are diagonal matrices with negative entries.
The matrix DJ is strictly d.d. if we have
(E)

di(λixK+i + γ˜i)>
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj γ˜ui + dK+iλixK+i
dK+i(λixi + γi)> diλixi
Which can be rewritten:
di(λixK+i + γ˜i)>
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj γ˜ui + dK+iλixK+i
dK+i >
diλixi
λixi+γi
Thus the system of 2K inequalities with 2K unknown variables is reduced
to the following system of K inequalities with K variables
(⋆) di(λixK+i + γ˜i) >
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj γ˜ui +
diλ
2
ixixK+i
λixi + γi
.
Indeed, when we get the positive di for i = 1, ...,K we let dK+i be such that
0 < dK+i −
diλixi
λixi+γi
< ǫ2λixi where ǫ = di(λixK+i + γ˜i)−
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj γ˜ui −
diλ
2
ixixK+i
λixi+γi
.
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Then we get di
(
λixK+i + γ˜i −
λ2ixixK+i
λixi+γi
)
>
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj γ˜ui.
Because x is the steady state, we get from (11) that xK+i =
γdimi
λixi+γi
, and we
have
λixK+i + γ˜i −
λ2ixixK+i
λixi + γi
= λixK+i + γ˜i −
λ2ixix
2
K+i
γdimi
= λixK+i + γ˜i −
λ2ix
2
K+i
γdimi
(
γdimi
λixK+i
−
γi
λi
)
= γ˜i +
λiγi
γdimi
x2K+i.
We define theK×K matrix B = (bij), where bii = γ˜i+
λiγi
γdimi
x2K+i and bij = −γ˜i
for j 6= i. Clearly bii is a positive quantity for all i. The system of inequality (⋆) is
equivalent to the system (⋆⋆) diaii >
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj γ˜ui. If DK is a diagonal matrix with
diagonal entries d1, d2, ..., dK , we may write it asDK = diag(d1, d2, ..., dK), then
we want BDK > 0. From Theorem Appendix B.3 (Hawkins-Simons), the in-
equality BDK > 0, with B having non positive off-diagonal elements has a pos-
itive solution if and only if det
 b11 · · · b1p... . . . ...
bp1 · · · bpp
 > 0 for all p = 1, 2, · · · ,K.
Let B˜pp =
 b11 · · · b1p... . . . ...
bp1 · · · bpp
We will now compute the determinant of the
matrix B˜pp. det(B˜pp) =
1
p∏
j=1
γ˜ui
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
b11
γ˜u1
−1 · · · −1
−1 b22
γ˜u2
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
... −1 −1
−1 · · · −1
bpp
γ˜up
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
det(B˜pp) =
1
p∏
j=1
γ˜uj
p∏
j=1
(
1 +
bjj
γ˜uj
)1− p∑
j=1
(−1)
1 +
bjj
γ˜uj

=
p∏
j=1
1 + bjjγ˜uj
γ˜uj

1 + p∑
j=1
1
1 +
bjj
γ˜uj
 ,
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The second member of the product in the first line above is the Hurwitz
determinant. We do have that det(B˜pp) > 0. Since det(B˜pp) > 0 and B has non
positive off-diagonal elements, then there exists a positive vector (d1, d2, ..., dK)
in RK such that B(d1, d2, ..., dK) > 0. Hence there exists a diagonal matrix
D = diag(d1, ..., d2k) such that DA is a strictly d.d. matrix.
Finally, from Theorem 3.1, the steady state of a partially segmented OTC
market model is asymptotically stable if the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the
steady state is such that all its eigenvalues have negative real parts. We have
just shown that the matrix J(x) is d.d. and its diagonal is negative. An appeal
to McKenzie’s Theorem (Appendix B.2) gives us the desired conclusion that all
eigenvalues of J(x) have negative real parts, hence x is stable. This completes
the proof of our main result.
Proof Theorem 4.1
Since we know that Pi = (1 − q)∆
l
i + q∆
h
i , it is sufficient to compute each
term of this equality.
We recall the following notations: V (hi, n) = xi, V (li, o) = yi, V (hi, o) = zi,
V (l, n) = w, λiµ(li, 0) = ai, γ˜di + r + λiµ(li, 0) = bi, γui + r + λiµ(hi, n) = bi,
λiµ(hi, n) = di and ri = γui + r. Using these notations, we have Pi = (1 −
q)(yi − w) + q(zi − xi).
From equality (15) and the expression of w we have
xi =
∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1− Λ(i, r))
Λ(i, r) + Ω(i, r) (C.1)
and
yi =
(
ri
(1− q)aiΓ(i, r)
) ∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1− Λ(i, r))
+
δhi
r
− Ω(i, r)
(
1 +
γ˜di
(1 − q)ai
)
ri
r
.
(C.2)
We also have
∆li =
(
ri
(1− q)aiΓ(i, r)
− 1
) ∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1− Λ(i, r))
+
δhi
r
− Ω(i, r)
(
1 +
γ˜di
(1− q)ai
)
ri
r
(C.3)
and
∆hi =
(
γdi
(1− q)aiΓ(i, r)
− Λ(i, r)
) ∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1− Λ(i, r))
+
δhi
r
− Ω(i, r)
(
1 +
γ˜di
(1 − q)ai
)
γdi
r
− Ω(i, r).
(C.4)
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A straightforward calculation and the relation Γ(i, r) = Ψ(i, r)+ r(1−q)ai give
the result.
Proof Proposition 6.1
We recall that the prices are given by
Pi =
(
γdi
(1 − q)aiΓ(i, r)
− Λ(i, r)
) ∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1 − Λ(i, r))
+
δhi
r
− qΩ(i, r)
(
1 + (1− r +
γdi
q
)(1 +
γ˜di
(1− q)ai
)
)
, ∀i ∈ I.
(C.5)
As before set Ψ(i, r) = (1 + γi+r
qdi
)(1 + γ˜di(1−q)ai ) − 1, Γ(i, r) = (1 +
γi+r
qdi
)(1 + γ˜di+r(1−q)ai ) − 1, Λ(i, r) =
Ψ(i,r)
Γ(i,r) , Ω(i, r) =
δdi
qdiΓ(i,r)
and Υ(i, r) =
qΩ(i, r)
(
1 + (1− r + γdi
q
)(1 + γ˜di(1−q)ai )
)
.
We have lim
γui→∞
Γ(i, r) = ∞ and lim
γui→∞
Ω(i, r) = lim
γui→∞
δdi
qdiΓ(i, r)
= 0. More-
over we have
lim
γui→∞
Λ(i, r) =
1 + γ˜di(1−q)ai
1 + γ˜di+r(1−q)ai
=
(1− q)λiµ(li, o) + γ˜di
(1− q)λiµ(li, o) + γ˜di + r
.
These expressions imply that lim
γui→∞
∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1 − Λ(i, r))
= 0. Since the
expression 1 + (1 − r + γdi
q
)(1 + γ˜di(1−q)ai ) is not a function of γui, the above
calculations and the algebra of limits allow us to conclude that
lim
γui→∞
Pi =
δhi
r
.
Similarly, we have lim
γdi→∞
Γ(i, r) = ∞ and lim
γui→∞
Ω(i, r) = 0. Moreover we
have
lim
γdi→∞
Λ(i, r) =
1
qdi
(1 + γ˜di(1−q)ai )
1
qdi
(1 + γ˜di+r(1−q)ai )
=
(1− q)λiµ(li, o) + γ˜di
(1 − q)λiµ(li, o) + γ˜di + r
.
Previous calculations imply that lim
γdi→∞
∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1− Λ(i, r))
= 0. Further-
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more, we have
lim
γdi→∞
Υ(i, r) = lim
γdi→∞
qΩ(i, r)
(
1 + (1− r +
γdi
q
)(1 +
γ˜di
(1− q)ai
)
)
= lim
γdi→∞
δdi
(
1 + (1 − r + γdi
q
)(1 + γ˜di(1−q)ai )
)
di
(
(1 + γi+r
qdi
)(1 + γ˜di+r(1−q)ai )− 1
)
=
δdi
(
(1− q)λiµ(li, o) + γ˜di
)
(1− q)λiµ(li, o) + γ˜di + r
.
Hence the limit of Pi when γdi tends to infinity is
lim
γdi→∞
Pi =
δhi
r
−
δdi
(
(1− q)λiµ(li, o) + γ˜di
)
(1− q)λiµ(li, o) + γ˜di + r
Here, if we assume that γ˜di runs to the infinity, we have lim
γdi→∞
Γ(i, r) = ∞
and lim
γui→∞
Ω(i, r) = 0. In addition, we have
lim
γdi→∞
Λ(i, r) =
1
(1−q)ai
(1 + γ˜ai
qdi
)
1
(1−q)ai
(1 + γ˜di+r
qai
)
= 1.
lim
γdi→∞
Υ(i, r) = lim
γdi→∞
qΩ(i, r)
(
1 + (1− r +
γdi
q
)(1 +
γ˜di
(1− q)ai
)
)
= lim
γdi→∞
δdi
(
1 + (1 − r + γdi
q
)(1 + γ˜di(1−q)ai )
)
di
(
(1 + γi+r
qdi
)(1 + γ˜di+r(1−q)ai )− 1
)
=
δdi (q(1− r) + γdi)
qλiµ(hi, n) + γi + r
.
Thus the limit of Pi when γ˜di tends to infinity is
lim
γdi→∞
Pi =
δhi
r
−
δdi (q(1− r) + γdi)
qλiµ(hi, n) + γi + r
We investigate now what happens when γ˜ui tends to infinity. Because the
parameter γ˜ui appears just in the expression Θ(i, r) =
∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i,r)
r+
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1−Λ(i,r))
, it is
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sufficient to show that the limit of Θ(i, r) when γ˜ui tends to infinity does not
exist. Assume in the first case that γ˜ui = γ˜uj for all i, j in {1, 2, ...,K}, then
lim
γ˜ui→∞
Θ(i, r) = lim
γ˜ui→∞
∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1− Λ(i, r))
=
∑
i∈I Ω(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I(1 − Λ(i, r))
.
We assume in the second case that γ˜ui = iγ˜u1 for all i in {1, 2, ...,K}, then
lim
γ˜ui→∞
Θ(i, r) = lim
γ˜ui→∞
∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1− Λ(i, r))
=
∑
i∈I iΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I i(1− Λ(i, r))
.
Since the two expressions
∑
i∈I Ω(i,r)
r+
∑
i∈I(1−Λ(i,r))
and
∑
i∈I iΩ(i,r)
r+
∑
i∈I i(1−Λ(i,r))
are not equal,
this implies that the price Pi has two different limits; this is a contradiction in
virtue of the uniqueness of the limit. Hence the limit lim
γ˜ui→∞
Pi does not exist.
Now we want to compute the limit: lim
λi→∞
Pi. We have lim
λi→∞
Γ(i, r) = 0 and
lim
λi→∞
Ψ(i, r) = 0.
Furthermore, we have
lim
λi→∞
Λ(i, r) = lim
γdi→∞
(1 + γi+r
qdi
)(1 + γ˜di(1−q)ai )− 1
(1 + γi+r
qdi
)(1 + γ˜di+r(1−q)ai )− 1
=
γi+r
qλiµ(hi,n)
+ γ˜di(1−q)λiµ(li,o)
γi+r
qλiµ(hi,n)
+ γ˜di+r(1−q)λiµ(li,o)
=
(1− q)(γi + r)µ(li, o) + qγ˜diµ(hi, n)
(1− q)(γi + r)µ(li, o) + q(γ˜di + r)µ(hi, n)
.
And we deduce the expression
lim
λi→∞
(1 − Λ(i, r)) = 1−
(1− q)(γi + r)µ(li, o) + qγ˜diµ(hi, n)
(1− q)(γi + r)µ(li, o) + q(γ˜di + r)µ(hi, n)
=
qrµ(hi, n)
(1− q)(γi + r)µ(li, o) + q(γ˜di + r)µ(hi, n)
.
We compute also these following limits,
lim
λi→∞
Ω(i, r) = lim
λi→∞
δdi
qdiΓ(i, r)
=
qrµ(hi, n)
(1− q)(γi + r)µ(li, o) + q(γ˜di + r)µ(hi, n)
;
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lim
λi→∞
γdi
(1− q)aiΓ(i, r)
=
qγdiµ(hi, n)
(1− q)δdiµ(li, o
Ω̂(i, r)
=
qγdiµ(hi, n)
(1− q)(γi + r)µ(li, o) + q(γ˜di + r)µ(hi, n)
and
lim
λi→∞
(
γdi
(1− q)aiΓ(i, r)
− Λ(i, r)
)
=
qγdiµ(hi, n)− (1− q)(γi + r)µ(li, o)− qγ˜diµ(hi, n)
(1 − q)(γi + r)µ(li, o) + q(γ˜di + r)µ(hi, n)
.
Replacing each limit computed above by its value allows us to obtain the fol-
lowing expression of prices when λi →∞:
Pi =
(
qγdiµ(hi, n)
(1− q)δdiµ(li, o
Ω̂(i, r)− Λ̂(i, r)
) ∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ̂(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1− Λ̂(i, r))
+
δhi
r
−
 δdi(2 − r + γdiq )
q
1−q
µ(hi,n)
µ(li,o
(γ˜di + r) + γi + r
 , ∀i ∈ I.
(C.6)
Proof Proposition 6.2 The prices Pi as functions of λj , with j 6= i are
given by
Pi(λj) =
(
γdi
(1− q)aiΓ(i, r)
− Λ(i, r)
) ∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i, r)
r +
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1− Λ(i, r))
+
δhi
r
− qΩ(i, r)
(
1 + (1− r +
γdi
q
)(1 +
γ˜di
(1 − q)ai
)
)
, ∀i 6= j
. (C.7)
We need to write Pi(λj) as an explicit function of λj and after that, we will
compute the derivatives to show whether Pi(λj) is increasing or decreasing.
Let us recall that Θ(λ1, ..., λK) =
∑
i∈I γ˜uiΩ(i,r)
r+
∑
i∈I γ˜ui(1−Λ(i,r))
. The only expression
of Pi where an occurrence of λj appears is Θ(λj), the others expressions do
not depend on λj . We must first compute explicitly the expressions Ω(i, r) and
1− Λ(i, r).
Ω(i, r) =
δdi
qaiΓ(i, r)
=
δdiλi
qµ(hi, n)
(
γi+r
qµ(hi,n)
λi +
γ˜di+r
(1−q)µ(li,o)
λi +
γi+r
qµ(hi,n)
γ˜di+r
(1−q)µt(li,o)
)
=
δdiλi
(γi + r +
γ˜di+r
(1−q)µ(li,o)
qµ(hi, n))λi + (γi + r)
γ˜di+r
(1−q)µ(li,o)
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and
Λ(i, r) =
(1 + γi+r
qdi
)(1 + γ˜di(1−q)ai )− 1
(1 + γi+r
qdi
)(1 + γ˜di+r(1−q)ai )− 1
=
γi+r
qµ(hi,n)
λi +
γ˜di
(1−q)µ(li,o)
λi +
γi+r
qµ(hi,n)
γ˜di
(1−q)µ(li,o)
γi+r
qµ(hi,n)
λi +
γ˜di+r
(1−q)µ(li,o)
λi +
γi+r
qµ(hi,n)
γ˜di+r
(1−q)µ(li,o)
.
We can deduce the expression
1− Λ(i, r) = 1−
γi+r
qµ(hi,n)
λi +
γ˜di
(1−q)µ(li,o)
λi +
γi+r
qµ(hi,n)
γ˜di
(1−q)µ(li,o)
γi+r
qµ(hi,n)
λi +
γ˜di+r
(1−q)µ(li,o)
λi +
γi+r
qµ(hi,n)
γ˜di+r
(1−q)µ(li,o)
=
r(qλiµ(hi, n) + γi + r)
(1− q)µ(li, o)
(
(γi + r +
γ˜di+r
(1−q)µ(li,o)
)λi + (γi + r)
γ˜di+r
(1−q)µ(li,o)
) .
By setting a = γi + r +
γ˜di+r
(1−q)µ(li,o)
qµ(hi, n), b = (γi + r)
γ˜di+r
(1−q)µ(li,o)
,
b1 =
rqµ(hi,n)
(1−q)µ(li,o)
and b0 =
r(γi+r)
(1−q)µ(li,o)
we get Ω(i, r) = δdiλi
aλi+b
and
1− Λ(i, r) = b1λi+b0
aλi+b
.
We have
Θ(λ1, ..., λK) =
∑
j∈I γ˜ujΩ(j, r)
r +
∑
j∈I γ˜uj(1− Λ(j, r))
=
δdiλi
aλi+b
+
∑
j 6=i
γ˜ujΩ(j, r)
b1λi+b0
aλi+b
+
∑
j 6=i
γ˜uj(1− Λ(j, r))
=
[γ˜uiδdi + a
∑
j 6=i
γ˜ujΩ(j, r)]λi + b
∑
j 6=i
γ˜ujΩ(j, r)
[b1 + ar + a
∑
j 6=i
γ˜uj(1− Λ(j, r))]λi + b0 + b(r +
∑
j 6=i
γ˜uj(1 − Λ(j, r)))
.
The partial derivative of Θ(λ1, ..., λK) in the direction of λi is
∂Θ(λ1, ..., λK)
∂λi
=
γ˜uiδdi[b0 + br + b
∑
j 6=i
γ˜uj(1 − Λ(j, r))] + (ab0 − b1b)
∑
j 6=i
γ˜ujΩ(j, r)(
[b1 + ar + a
∑
j 6=i
γ˜uj(1− Λ(j, r))]λi + b0 + b(r +
∑
j 6=i
γ˜uj(1− Λ(j, r)))
)2 .
Let us show that the quantity ab0 − b1b is positive, that is ab0 − b1b > 0.
Replacing each of a, b, b0, b1 by its value lead us to
ab0 − b1b =
r(γi + r)
2
(1− q)µ(li, o)
+
r(γi + r)(γ˜di + r)
(1− q)2µ(li, o)2
qµ(hi, n)−
r(γi + r)(γ˜di + r)
(1− q)2µ(li, o)2
qµ(hi, n)
=
r(γi + r)
2
(1− q)µ(li, o)
> 0.
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Hence ∂Θ(λ1,...,λK)
∂λi
> 0. The partial derivative
∂Pj(λi)
∂λi
= Aj
∂Θ(λ1,...,λK)
∂λi
,
were Aj =
γdj
(1−q)ajΓ(j,r)
− Λ(j, r) determines the variation of the price. Its sign
is entirely determined by the sign of Aj .
Now let us investigate to the sign of Aj . We have Aj > 0 is equivalent to
γdj
(1−q)λjµ(lj,o)
−Ψ(j, r) > 0. By replacing Ψ(j, r) by its value, a direct calculation
gives us
(γi+r)(γ˜dj+r)
λjqµ(hj,n)
< γdj − γ˜dj −
(γj+r)
qµ(hj,n)
(1− q)µ(lj, o).
(1). If γdj − γ˜dj −
(γj+r)
qµ(hj,n)
(1 − q)µ(lj, o) ≤ 0, then Aj > 0. Hence the price
Pj(λi) is decreasing.
Assume that γdj − γ˜dj −
(γj+r)
qµ(hj,n)
(1− q)µ(lj, o) > 0, We set
λ̂j =
(γj+r)(γ˜dj+r)
(γdj−γ˜dj)qµ(hj,n)−(γj+r)(1−q)µ(lj,o)
.
(2). For λj = λ̂j , the price Pj(λi) does not depend on the value λi, it is a
constant function in λi.
(2). For λj > λ̂j , the price Pj(λi) is increasing and for λj < λ̂j , the price
Pj(λi) is decreasing. This completes the proof.
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